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Title: Information Security Awareness in a developing country context: insights from the 
government sector in Saudi Arabia  
Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of the article is to increase understanding of employee information 
security awareness in a government sector setting and illuminate the problems that public 
sector organisations in a developing context face when seeking to establish an information 
security awareness program. 
 
Methodology: An interpretive research design was followed to develop an empirically 
enriched understanding of information security awareness perceptions, aspirations, challenges 
and enablers in the context of Saudi Arabia as a developing country. The study adopts a single 
case study approach including face-to-face interviews with senior employees as well as 
document analysis. 
 
Findings: The paper theorises the importance of individual information security awareness, 
knowledge and behaviour and identifies a number of facilitating conditions: customisation to 
employee and organisational needs, interactivity, innovation, frequency, integration of both 
electronic and physical learning resources, and rewarding the acquisition of in-depth security-
related actionable knowledge. 
 
Originality: This study is one of the first to examine information security awareness as a socio-
technical process within a government sector organisation in a developing country context. 
 
Keywords: Information Security Awareness; Information Security Behaviour; Government 
sector; Public servants; Saudi Arabia 
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1. Introduction 
Information security has become one of the basic operational requirements of any type of 
organisation, especially government organisations, and it entails safeguarding key information 
assets from security threats (e.g. unauthorised access, use, dissemination, corruption or 
destruction) that could endanger its availability, integrity and confidentiality (Gulappagol & 
ShivaKumar, 2017; Moon et al., 2018). In essence, the viable continuity and growth of 
organisations relies critically on assuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their 
informational assets (Rao & Nayak, 2014). In this context, organisations have progressively 
equipped themselves with different information security controls, namely administrative and 
technical security controls, in order to protect from as much security risks as possible. 
Examples of such controls would include information security awareness programmes as well 
as technical measures commonly known as network firewalls and virus detection systems 
(Johnson, 2015).  
Individual actors are considered one of the indispensable elements of organisational 
information security. On the one hand, they are expected to be safely performing their given 
roles. That is the case, for instance, of a user interacting with their organisations information 
system via authorised user accounts and passwords or also the case of an administrator 
continuously monitoring and managing the information security solutions employed by their 
organisation. On the other hand, individual actors could endanger the security status of an 
organisation through acts of negligence (Rao & Nayak, 2014). For instance, when an 
organisational insider clicks on a malicious link enclosed in an email, being unaware of the 
potential harm that can be caused by such a mistake (Jakobsson & Myers, 2006). 
Given the complex nature of individual behaviour and the various dimensions of security 
vulnerability in organisational settings (Sebescen and Vitak, 2017), relying completely on 
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security-related technologies is insufficient to reduce all types of security risks and elevate the 
information security level of organisations in general. The insufficiencies of technical controls 
in a context where human intervention and insider threats (Ho et al, 2018) are so critical is well 
summarised by Schneier (2011) in the assertion that if you think technology can solve your 
security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the 
technology. In this sense, the effective role of non-technical information security 
interventions, namely information security awareness, is emphasised by a variety of studies in 
the field (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013, Siponen, 2000) as a form of 
deterrent information security measure (Tipton and Krause, 2007). More specifically, 
information security awareness involves making individuals aware of the importance of their 
conduct in relation to information security. In practice, such protective measures should be 
taken into consideration when planning and implementing the overall organisational security 
architecture (Rao and Nayak, 2014) and taking a realist and pragmatic stance (neither too 
utopian nor excessively dystopian), anchored on evidence-based framing strategies can help 
unpack information security as a complex socio-technical challenge (de Brujin and Janssen, 
2017). 
The limited existence of research in the domain of information security awareness focusing on 
governmental organisations has motivated Abrahams (2011) call for more scholarship to 
advance the understanding of information security behavioural factors in public sector and 
governmental settings. Within existing studies, such as Parsons et al.s (2014) inquiry into 
Australian government organisations, it is found that employees high level of knowledge in 
information security does not necessarily guarantee an adequate information security 
behaviour, which makes the case for an enhanced understanding of how information security 
awareness contributes to improve information security behaviour. Both contextually and 
geographically, there also seems to exist a bias towards Western contexts (Crossler, 2013) and 
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a lack of coverage of how information security as a grand societal challenge is experienced in 
developing countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the studies that do focus on the Saudi 
Arabian context either identify the insufficiencies of information security awareness (Alarifi et 
al., 2012) or focus exclusively on information technology professionals, which may be 
understood to bias results (Alzamil, 2012).  
Despite an increase in the use of information technologies across organisations, alongside the 
persistence of human behaviour-related threats such as social engineering (Hanus et al., 2018), 
limited action is taken to increase end users information security awareness (Aloul, 2012). 
Few studies have empirically addressed information security awareness activities and their 
interactions with the various organisational processes and events. Some notable exceptions 
include: Albrechtsen and Hovdens (2010) identification that locally-based employee 
participation, group  interaction/ reflection create  changes in  information  security  awareness  
and behaviour at individual level;  Tsohou et al.s (2012) examination of information security 
DZDUHQHVVDVDPDQDJHULDODQGVRFLRဨWHFKQLFDOSURFHVVZLWKLQDQRUJDQLVational context; Ion et 
al.s (2015) analysis of the discrepancies in the behaviour of security experts vs. non-security-
expert internet users; McComarc et als (2017) analysis of the relationship  between  
individuals  information security awareness and variables such as gender, age, personality and 
risk-taking propensity; and Doherty and Tajuddins (2018) exploration of the ways in which 
users perceptions of information value influence their level of compliance with organisational 
information security policies. Though relatively nascent, this stream of research seems 
indicative of a growing recognition that technology alone is insufficient to deliver a complete 
information security solution (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Abawajy, 2014), and that more attention 
VKRXOGEHGHGLFDWHGWRWKHFRQIOXHQFHRIEHKDYLRXUDODQGWHFKQRORJLFDOGHIHQFHVg÷WoHW
al., 2016; Safa et al., 2016). It is thus crucial to delve deeper in the appreciation of the socio-
technical aspects surrounding information security awareness, notably employee aspirations 
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and perceived challenges and enablers in a developing context. In this context, the main aim of 
the article is to explore the various ways in which information security awareness influence 
employee security behaviour in government sector organisations, in the context of Saudi 
Arabia as a developing country. The aim is further specified in the following research 
questions: (a) in what manner do government sector employees perceive information security 
awareness initiatives to impact information security behaviour? (b) which factors do they 
perceive to operate as challenges and enablers of information security awareness? These 
questions are addressed through a case study of a government Agency in Saudi Arabia, and the 
empirical results position the contribution of the study within the field of information security 
behaviour research in general. 
In terms of structure, the article is organised as follows. We begin with an identification of the 
different research foci on information security behaviour and information security awareness 
to develop a general picture of the field. We subsequently introduce the case and the data 
collection and analysis procedures employed. This is followed by a section in which the 
findings on government sector employees experience and understanding of information 
security awareness are presented. Our findings are then discussed in light of previous research 
and we conclude the article with remarks on how they contribute to the information security 
awareness-related activities in the government sector. 
 
2. The impact of information security awareness on information security behaviour 
In todays growing security threat landscape, organisations should consider developing a 
protective shield to guard against internal information security risks initiated by employees 
actions as well as external information security threats that might take advantage of employees 
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negligent behaviour. A more security-aware workforce will protect organisations from falling 
into hackers human-targeted traps (Siponen, 2000). In particular, social engineering, when 
used maliciously against organisations, is a considerable threat to employees, manipulating 
them into performing actions that could expose their organisation to serious security risks 
(Workman, 2008; Hadnagy, 2010). For instance, the consequences are dramatic when an 
attacker succeeds in obtaining sensitive information from employees by luring them to reveal 
secret personal information such as their user account / password in order to steal their network 
identity and gain unauthorised access to their organisations systems. One common form of 
social engineering are phishing attacks, in which hackers create fake emails infected with 
malicious links and/or attachments and send them targeting an employee or group of 
employees. When performed in low volume and attacking specific users or employees of firms, 
organisations and governments, these attacks are known as spear phishing or whaling 
(Stembert et al., 2015). Successful attempts typically allow unsolicited access into the 
organisations systems and can further establish a point of entry for more sophisticated security 
attacks (Hadnagy & Fincher, 2015). Ransomware breaches can also be the result of social 
engineering attacks. In this case, self-propagating malware uses encryption to hold a victims 
data ransom until a payment is made. (Chen & Bridges, 2017). This was recently illustrated by 
the largescale WannaCry cyber-attack (Ehrenfeld, 2017), during which more than sixty 
National Health Service Trusts in the United Kingdom were prevented from accessing patient 
records, ultimately leading to costly delays and cancelations of non-urgent appointments and 
surgeries (Ghafur et al., 2019). In a work environment where the prevalence of these kinds of 
threats is becoming more common, enhancing employees awareness level and associated 
protective behaviour (Jansson & von Solms, 2013) becomes crucial. 
Studies focusing on the significance of organisations information security awareness 
endeavours attribute its positive impact on individual information security behaviour in the 
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sense that the risk of employee negligence can be alleviated by employing a preventive 
approach (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013) that mitigates risks originating 
both internally and externally (D'Arcy et al., 2009). A stream of behavioural psychology 
theories  including theory of planned behaviour, general deterrence theory (e.g. Workman and 
Gathegi, 2007) and protection motivation theory - has been traditionally used to quantitatively 
measure the impact of information security awareness on individuals security-related conduct 
(Lebek et al., 2014). Drawing on theory of planned behaviour, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) explored 
the impact of employees information security awareness level on their intention to exert a 
secure behaviour compatible with the organisations information security policies, particularly 
by examining its influence on their attitude and its motivating factors. The findings firmly 
positioned information security awareness as one of the important predictors of employees 
security-related behaviour through its positive relationship with employees attitude. Similarly, 
and focusing on the identification of which factors matter the most for existence of security-
compliant behaviour, Haeussinger & Kranz (2013) highlight the role of information security 
awareness initiatives  an argument already made by DArcy et al. (2009) when identifying 
information security misconduct deterrent measures. 
A possible criticism of this family of studies is their use of behavioural psychology theories to 
establish conclusions on actual security behaviour when in effect what is being measured is the 
intention to comply with or violate the organisations security policies and guidelines 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Haeussinger & Kranz, 2013). Another branch of 
studies has attempted to measure the significance of various internal and external factors on 
employees behaviour, which helped identifying the set of factors influencing employees 
information security awareness levels (Chen et al., 2012; D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Herath & 
Rao, 2009a; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Hu etal. 2012; Ifinedo, 2012; Siponen et al., 2014). More 
recently, factors such as attentional and motor impulsivity have been identified as significant 
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positive predictors of risky cybersecurity behaviours, whereas individual features such as 
openness to experience, honesty and agreeableness were found to correlate with lower risk 
taking and higher information security awareness (Hadlington, 2017). In general terms, this 
branch of studies has provided mostly a quantitative evaluation of employees information 
security awareness level with some variation in organisational contexts and selected theoretical 
constructs (Alsaif et al., 2015; Chan and Mubarak, 2012, Parsons et al. 2014), but nevertheless 
with an emphasis on private sector organisations. 
 
3. Factors influencing employees information security awareness 
Knowing the set of internal and external factors that can positively influence awareness levels 
is essential in understanding information security awareness initiatives in organisations and 
their effect on individuals security behaviour (Bulgurcu et al, 2010; Haeussinger & Kranz , 
2013; Chen et al., 2012; D'Arcy and Devaraj, 2012; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Hu et al., 2012; Ifinedo, 2012; Siponen et al., 2014). Internal and motivational factors 
influencing employees information security awareness level and ultimately their security 
behaviour are mainly attributed to their predisposition towards conforming with existent 
information security policies, their commitment to the organisations security resources as well 
as their previous encounter with information security issues and threats (Bulgurcu et al, 2010; 
Haeussinger & Kranz, 2013; Herath & Rao, 2009b). The notion that a successful information 
security awareness programme must be based on improving employees cognitive frames of 
reference is well established (Thomson and von Solms, 1998), especially when training is 
problem-centred (Pawlowski et al., 2015) and designed with an emphasis on appropriate 
security practices that improve online behaviour (McChrohan et al., 2010), therefore aiming at 
reducing organisational insiders cyber risk behaviour (Bulgurcu et al, 2010; Hu et al., 2012; 
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Herath & Rao, 2009b). Empirical evidence in several studies has proven the strong connection 
between employees' attitude and their behavioural intention to display information security-
aware behaviour. Therefore, employee attitude often emerges in the information security 
literature as one of the main constructs when examining information security awareness within 
organisations (Bulgurcu et al, 2010; Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013; Parsons et al., 2014). Of 
special relevance is employees level of organisational commitment - translated into the 
predisposition to behave within the organisations framework of accepted security behaviour 
(Herath and Rao, 2009b)  and the existence of some form of experience with information 
security, which will impact future security behaviour and induce increased levels of 
consciousness, threat awareness and knowledge of remedial actions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013). 
At organizational level, other factors such as organisational culture, leadership (Siponen, 2000; 
Connolly et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2012) and the existence of reward and sanction mechanisms 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012; Herath & Rao; 2009a) are also found to induce 
employees to comply with recommended information security behaviour. Organisations 
concern with the fulfilment of their members is related to an increase in employee loyalty and 
perceived sense of attachment, which in turn promotes adequate security conduct amongst 
organisational members, expressed also as concern for the security the organisations 
information resources and an open stance towards discussion information security challenges 
and avoidance strategies. Top management support is critical for the solidification of this type 
of organisational culture (Hu et al., 2012). Enabling ingredients of a well-developed 
organizational information security awareness are also found in reward and sanction 
mechanisms, although with some polarised views of which mechanisms operate as key 
determinants and some studies (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009a) arguing for the effectiveness of 
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sanctions as a deterrent of misconduct, whilst others advocate the role of rewards in positively 
shaping employees security compliant behaviour (Chen et al., 2012). 
 
4. Methods and Data 
We followed an interpretive research epistemology and adopted a case study approach (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2000) for this study. The empirical methods for data collection included document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data were analysed with inductive data analysis 
techniques (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
The study was conducted at a Saudi Arabia government Agency established by Royal Decree 
and with a strategic remit to plan and oversee urban, energy infrastructure and environmental 
development. Interview participants consisted of fifteen senior employees originating in the 
various departments that compose the organisation, as depicted in Figure 1 below. The 
sampling of senior employees is an acknowledgement that there are managerial, strategic, and 
financial considerations in every organisations best efforts to become cybersecure. This means 
that, in terms of information security awareness, minimising exposure to information security 
hazards is not just the responsibility of the IT department  it is every departments job. The 
diverse roles of these senior managers provide unique insights into the production and 
integration of information security awareness perspectives at organisational level, especially 
how information conversations across teams and workplace colleagues develop, how risk is 
assessed, how defences are improved and how overall decision-making to enhance information 
security is made.  
Following the principle of identifying an information-rich setting, the selection of the case was 
paradigmatic (Flyvbjerg, 2007), given the studys focus on exploring employee information 
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security awareness in a government-sector organisation. Similar to other initiatives promoted 
by governments in different regions of the globe (e.g. the UKs National Cyber Security Centre 
or Germanys Federal Office for Information Security), the Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology (MCIT) in Saudi Arabia has issued a National Information Security 
Strategy (NISS) in 2011 yielding several key recommendations that ought to be implemented 
to increase increasing information security awareness (Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology, 2011). Moreover, following the countrys 2030 vision, investment 
on digital infrastructure has increased rapidly (Alshuaibi, 2017). More importantly, due to 
recent security incidents, the countrys spending on information security has increased as well. 
For instance, the government has established the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) for 
the sole purpose of strengthening the countrys information security position (Hathaway et al., 
2017). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The participants, profiled in Table 1, are characterised in terms of their organisational 
affiliation as core members and by their professional nomenclatures. They have all undergone 
mandatory information security awareness training offered by the Agency. In order to maintain 
the confidentiality of participants, alias names have been created and assigned to each 
interviewee. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The information security policy documents produced by the Agency  summarised in Table 2 
- were also collected to perform cross-analysis against the data collected via the interviews, 
which allowed the developed of further insights into the role and practice of information 
security awareness. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
This level of identification was considered sufficient to conduct the analysis of data and 
respects the research confidentiality parameters agreed by participants in consent forms prior 
to the study and approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sheffield. 
The interviews were conducted over a period of two months (see Appendix 1 for the interview 
guide)7KH\ODVWHGRQDYHUDJHILIW\PLQXWHVDQGZHUHDXGLRဨUecorded and transcribed by the 
first author. 
To select interviewees and policy documents, we used theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt 1989). 
The selection was based on the initial research topic and objectives, and the aim was to present 
a real-world case that transparently represents the phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). 
Both the policy documents and interview data were manually analysed following inductive 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and its stages of understanding data, developing 
codes and identifying themes, which are reported in the Results section. Following this 
inductive process of data analysis allowed the researchers to read and re-read through policy 
documents and interview transcripts, assign initial codes, note connections, look for themes 
and work through them in terms of internal consistency and external heterogeneity. The 
analysis was a process of interaction and refinement, co-developed by the two researchers, until 
a shared sense of analytical saturation was achieved. 
More specifically, as prescribed by Braun and Clarke (2006), the researchers read and re-read 
each interview transcript and policy document to familiarise themselves with the data; (2) 
produced initial codes systematically across the data set; (3) collated initial codes into potential 
themes; (4) refined themes based on internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Patton, 
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1990); (5) and defined and labelled final themes. The iterative process of comparing and 
linking themes proceeded to generating an illustrative framework that is representative of the 
analysis, presented in synthesis in Table 3 below and in detail in the Results section of the 
article. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Internal validity of data was strengthened through the use of constant comparison (Silverman, 
2000). Saturation occurred when new codes failed to emerge from the data. The reliability of 
the analysis was sought through the collaborative development of coding and identification of 
themes between the authors, who followed the principle of consensus in order to attain 
interpretive agreement and reliability.  
 
5. Results  
5.1 Perceived impact of information security awareness 
Information security awareness is considered as a protection factor against employees 
potential lack of knowledge about security threats they might fall victim to, without proper 
identification or detection in advance: ISA is about employee's knowledge of the 
vulnerabilities or mistakes through which the system is breached, such as electronic phishing 
emails (Qadir, Information Systems Coordinator). This is especially important in the context 
of the organisations duty of safeguarding citizens personal and financial data, as expressed in 
policy: 
The user shall not reveal or publicise confidential or proprietary information 
which includes, but not limited to: financial information, contract & projects, 
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investment opportunities, organizational strategies and plans, databases and the 
information contained therein () (IU2013). 
The internalisation of this duty was acknowledged by most participants as a continuous 
reminder that information security awareness is a dynamic knowledge process. In that sense, 
information security awareness is perceived as an opportunity to increase employees 
knowledge about the organisations policies and guidelines, therefore fulfilling an educational 
role, in the sense that it [informs] people about the policies and procedures that are being used 
in terms of information security and information crimes (Ghazi, Project Manager). Ideally, it 
should become an effective generator of good habits and ultimately a culture of operational 
safety, where the possibility of vulnerability is minimised and controlled:  
() if the institute stimulates employees, they will be motivated automatically. If 
there is information continuously, then people will get used to it and start adapting 
to it normally. It becomes a kind of reminder every time, employees then obtain 
related information and background and with time it becomes a culture (Fadil, 
Human Resources Manager). 
Achieving that state requires systematising the information dissemination beyond irregular 
communication efforts, in order for information security awareness to attain impact and operate 
effectively as an active reminder of security-related behaviour, recommendations, guidelines, 
potential security threats, and possible ways to overcome them:  
Frankly there is an impact. On my junk email I receive emails but before I open 
any I make sure that if there is a link or something to be opened and since my job 
entails dealing with investors. I make sure before I open it that it came from the 
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right email address so now I would say there is more consciousness () (Daoud, 
CEO Officer Advisor). 
5.2 Desired impact of information security awareness 
The success of information security awareness initiatives was perceived by mostly employees 
to rely on effective planning and alignment with workplace activities, so that it becomes an 
acceptable mechanism that does not negatively impact work (Salim, Human Resources 
Director). In, turn, such initiatives would enable comprehensive knowledge in terms of 
information security including information about possible security threats that could be faced 
by non-IT employees as well as information about required information security policies and 
guidelines. The foundations for this knowledge are understood to lie with formal, immersive 
and experiential security training: 
"A deeper approach would be to include an internal course which allows for 
learning in a deeper and wider way. Besides it gives a chance to the employee to 
ask questions, respond and experiment." (Qadir, Information Systems Coordinator)  
The emphasis on experimentation conveys the aspiration for content that clearly reflects the 
real security dangers and the necessary precautions and mitigating actions, which are only 
accessible when employees are engaged in the problem () and know the real damage, 
something concrete! (Jamal, Executive Spokesperson). This endeavour is facilitated by the 
regular assessment of employees information security awareness level, to allow the 
identification of necessary improvements (Abbas, Support Services Director). 
Besides formal learning approaches, employees expressed interest to learn through non-
traditional learning methods, including self-learning and the use of digital resources. For 
instance, learning gained through e-learning courses, electronic quizzes, and simulated 
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phishing attacks were reported to be more attractive and engaging (Jamal, Executive 
Spokesperson), easier to recall (Farida, Trainer-Assessor), and likely to encourage 
conversation between employees (Jamal, Executive Spokesperson). Such desired impact 
indicates employees willingness to utilise more innovative and interactive learning 
approaches. 
In addition to more innovative ways to learn about information security, the impact of 
awareness materials is perceived to be greater if it is expanded into a more organised effort 
where a variety of awareness materials is quickly mobilised and accessed, such as in the case 
of periodicals, electronic materials that can be easily shared with others (Masud, Industrial 
Coordinator), campaigns, events or the use of social media, for instance: 
Twitter hashtags where its impact would be very strong particularly if used as part 
of a campaign or using the 5-10 seconds YouTube adds as a reminder which would 
have a bigger impact and another example would be campaigns in Snapchat, which 
nowadays became a very attractive tool (Saida, Analytics Consultant).  
Although the convenience of electronic interactions is praised by most employees, face-to-face 
interaction with IT personnel is still considered relevant, particularly in maintaining a 
meaningful relationship with staff members and providing reassurance of personalised, 
dedicated and responsive action. This kind of response entails more dedication than brief 
encounters with IT support on a trouble-shooting basis: 
"For instance, if something happens, someone from the IT department comes to 
check your device only for a few minutes and then disappears. He doesnt explain 
the issue or how it happened and how we can avoid it or what was our mistake?" 
(Masud, Industrial Coordinator).  
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5.3 Perceived challenges and enablers of information security awareness  
Employees have collectively highlighted several factors in relation to their internal value 
system, which they perceived to have an impact in their information security-related 
behaviours. Amongst these factors, a sense of individual responsibility towards contributing to 
the Agencys security was frequently alluded to as an integral component of their professional 
ethos: It is always someones values what will top everything else; therefore, a person will 
care about information security for that reason first and foremost. (Tarek, Inspector). 
This stance, where a concern for security is taken as a common denominator of government 
sector workers professional praxis, leads to a very negative framing of organisational attempts 
to punish noncompliance and misconduct. Consequences in terms of professional progression 
are particularly unwelcome and the use of rewards as incentives of good citizen behaviour is 
preferred:  
In my opinion, sanctions would have an impact, but it would be a negative one 
since no one likes punishment. I had a say in it, I would avoid sanctions as much 
as possible. I would mostly concentrate on awareness and rewards, even if 
symbolic (Masud, Industrial Coordinator). 
A minority of employees sees some disciplining value through corrective action (Omar, 
Economist) in the application of sanctions, but most participants argue that the emphasis should 
be on substantiating workers knowledge base through information security awareness 
initiatives and, in particular, to provide advanced information technology skills. Knowing how 
to deal with information systems is essential in enabling employees to identify the possible 
security risks, assess them correctly and ultimately be able to conceptualise the related 
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damages, which indicates a logical nexus between employees computer skills and their 
vulnerability towards information security attacks: 
The first thing that employees need to have is a solid level of information 
technology skills, in order to have a grasp of the possible loopholes and risks that 
could be faced. The more an employee is ignorant with regards to IT, the more 
easily he/she can be attacked (Imad, Customer Support Coordinator). 
An important opportunity to further absorb information security-related knowledge lies with 
workers first-hand experiences. Personal experiences with information security typically 
involve identifying the perceived threat, searching for information about the incident and most, 
importantly, choosing a suitable response such as avoidance or directly seeking support. Such 
threat-response situations are real life experiences that will have significant impact not only on 
employees reception of information security awareness initiatives but also - if guided properly 
 will convert employees into indirect promoters of information security in the Agency: 
There were signs. I have received couple of them repeatedly. When I asked about 
them, I was told that those are some form of breach used for spying or causing 
harm. For instance, someone sends an email and it has a link or a fake attachment. 
I later realised that this is called phishing. The important thing is that I have not 
opened the enclosed attachment and did not forward the email and reported the 
issue, to be shared (Masud, Industrial Coordinator). 
Knowing about issues that had happened to other co-workers was perceived by most 
participants to be beneficial in developing critical awareness about experienced threats and 
related responses and in consolidating an organisational culture that is security-focused. 
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6. Discussion 
The information security literature has, in general terms, emphasised the importance of 
employees attitudes and behavioural intentions as predictors of actual information security 
compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2012; Herath & Rao, 2009b). Focusing 
specifically on the government-sector, our analysis reveals that employees perceive 
information security awareness as a form of protection against risks associated with 
information security misconduct, which aligns with existing literature that positions 
information security awareness as a deterrent from insider threats (D'Arcy et al., 2009).  
The experience of risks and threats is generally claimed to play a useful role in shaping a more 
acute information security awareness and adopting a more vigilant stance (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013). More than actually falling victim to information security 
attacks, employees in the case government organisation value the experience of peers who have 
been exposed to threats and successfully dodged them, as it allows them to model behaviour 
on how to handle and report such incidents.  
In this sense, information security awareness is viewed as a precautionary measure to avoid 
risks in relation to employees negligence of recommended security conduct. It requires 
planning and formalisation to ensure the effective allocation of resources (Desman, 2001; 
Siponen, 2000; Thomson and von Solms, 1998). Indeed, in the case government organisation 
there is self-acknowledged recognition of a positive impact of information security awareness 
in individual information security behaviour, which echoes the perceptions of employees in 
private sector organisations where the positive impact of information security awareness 
endeavours on the intention to exert security compliant conduct has also been found (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010; Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013; Choi et al., 2018).  
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However, this study extends prior literature by providing novel insights into specific 
requirements identified regarding the effectiveness of current organisational information 
security awareness and the calls for more knowledge-focused activities, indicating strong 
information security-specific knowledge acquisition aspirations. This finding adds a new 
perspective to Siponens (2000) argument that, in order to guarantee a positive impact of 
information security awareness on employees, it is necessary to convince them of the necessity 
to abandon or adhere to a certain security act through reason and argument. Such convincing, 
we argue, operates through employees agency and ability to access satisfactory knowledge 
that will allow them to practically apply the gained information both at work and in their 
personal lives.  
Agency is particularly important even if top-management support is widely acknowledged as 
an enabler, especially at the levels of compliance behaviour and security controls 
implementation (Siponen, 2001; Hu et al., 2012), although not always experienced to the 
desired extent, in practice. 
Contrary to claims in the literature (DArcy et al., 2009), managerial action at the levels of 
sanctioning misconduct and information security policy violation is perceived by employees at 
the case government organisation to be detrimental to employees commitment, especially if 
there is an impact on performance evaluation, which may engender feelings of resentment and 
disengagement. Nevertheless, employees perform what Bulgurcu et al. (2010) describe as an 
assessment of behaviour costs and benefits and are mindful of its consequences. They instead 
prefer information security awareness initiatives that emphasise the use of rewards (Chen et 
al., 2012) as an instrument to draw employees attention and entice them to acquire more 
knowledge on information security. This type of emphasis on the use of rewards gives 
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information security a face (de Brujin and Janssen, 2017) and puts the employees, natural 
organisational allies, in the spotlight. 
A fundamental component of that knowledge base comprises sophisticated computer security 
skills that enable employees to distinguish potential security threats, anticipate their impact and 
initiate suitable responses. This requires, on the one hand, embedding security training in 
government organisations information security awareness efforts and, on the other hand, 
designing suitable learning experiences, content, forms of communication as well as planning 
and evaluation instruments. Haeussinger and Kranz (2013), have demonstrated that, among 
other factors, employing information training programs within private sector organisations has 
a substantial influence on employees awareness and information security conduct, to the 
extent that it may impede internal members from behaving against the organisations interest. 
Similarly, D'Arcy et al. (2009) have shown that information security awareness training can 
dissuade employees from acts of misconduct that could jeopardize their organisations 
information security strategy. This study extends this line of inquiry by providing insights into 
specific requirements identified for a government sector organisation. These include 
customisation to employees and organisational needs, interactivity, innovation, frequency and 
the integration of both electronic and physical learning resources.  
Interestingly, employees in the case government organisation have shown great desire for in-
depth and formal training approaches accompanied by one-to one communication with 
information security awareness professionals. Yet, they have also revealed willingness for 
more innovative and interactive, computer-based learning approaches, mainly due to the 
perceived novelty and flexibility of such approaches. Both approaches reflect the preferences 
and needs of government employees towards information security awareness learning and 
training efforts. In recent years, the information security literature has shown interest in 
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electronic and interactive security training methods such as e-learning and game-based training 
programs where a positive impact on individuals information security knowledge and 
behaviour is observable. For instance, Hagen & Albrechtsen (2009) tested the perceived impact 
of information security e-learning programmes on private sector employees to identify 
substantial improvements in their information security awareness levels, namely knowledge 
and behavioural aspects. However, a later study (Hagen et al., 2011) revealed that the long-
term impact of such programs has declined over time, particularly in relation to employees 
gained knowledge, which signals the necessity of frequent training initiatives. This assertion 
strengths the call made by the case government organisation employees for the regular 
frequency and compulsory nature of information security training and awareness raising 
activities. 
Moreover, employees desire for electronic means of communication is not restricted to 
training activities and is also reflected in their preferred awareness channels namely electronic 
mails as well as their preference for non-printed awareness materials over printed ones. This 
extends current knowledge on digital information security learning methods (Cone et al., 2007) 
and places it within the specific context of government organisations.  
Finally, and remaining true to what they consider to be a learning process, employees have 
expressed the need for an evaluation mechanism so they could obtain formal feedback on their 
information security awareness level. This resonates with the practice of private sector 
organisations, where evaluation has been highlighted as a key element in the design and 
implementation of effective information security awareness programs (Desman, 2001; 
Hansche, 2001; Peltier, 2005), especially through the use of phishing simulations (Dodge et 
al., 2007; Jansson & von Solms, 2013). 
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We acknowledge that our interpretive approach cannot aim at producing generalisable 
explanations (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991), because it is primarily focused on producing an 
understanding of the context and the processes (Walsham, 1995) of information security 
awareness as intersubjectively experienced in the case organisation. However, the regularities 
observed in the context of this Saudi governmental agency have implications beyond the 
studied research setting and a number of recommendations is analytically transferable to other 
governmental agencies in developing countries: 
1. Commitment to effective planning in terms of formalised information security 
awareness activities as well as the need for more engaging activities. Conducting 
security awareness campaigns which combine the impact of various awareness 
materials with the organisations needs to effectively promote its information security 
capabilities is a recommended practice; 
2. A mixed learning approach is recommended to satisfy preferences for both face-
to-face interaction as well as electronic self-learning approaches. In addition, given the 
prospect of declining long-term impact of information security e-learning courses, it is 
recommended that information security awareness training activities are 
institutionalised as mandatory and regular; 
3. The implementation of formal evaluations methods including simulations and 
questionnaires is vital to determine employees information security awareness levels 
and extract feedback for the re-design and continuous improvement of information 
security awareness training interventions.  
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7. Conclusions 
The use of an interpretative research design, as in the current study, is still unusual in the 
context of information security awareness research in government sector organisations and, in 
addition, in the context developing countries. By investigating employees across the various 
departments of a Saudi government Agency, our objective was to illuminate the role played by 
information security awareness in government-sector employees information security 
behaviour from an empirically enriched perspective, and with an explicit focus on information 
security awareness perceptions, aspirations, challenges and enablers. 
As governmental organisations in developing countries become increasingly information-
intensive and digitalised, the ways in which the development studies and information science 
communities examine information security awareness become increasingly important for 
understanding the complex contextualised information security management practices, 
including their processes and inherent interactions.  
Turning to our specific findings, the study indicates that employees perceive information 
security awareness as a form of protection against risks associated with information security 
misconduct. Theoretically, this highlights employee agency and determination to access 
satisfactory knowledge  mostly through blended forms of training and peer exchange - that 
will allow them to practically apply the gained information both at work and in their personal 
lives. In a similar fashion emphasising agency and challenging existing assumptions, the 
sanctioning of misconduct and information security policy violations are perceived to be 
detrimental to employees commitment and sense of engagement. Conversely, the 
effectiveness of information security awareness activities is found to be reinforced, amongst 
other factors, by: customisation to employee and organisational needs, interactivity, 
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innovation, frequency, integration of both electronic and physical learning resources, and 
rewarding the acquisition of in-depth security-related actionable knowledge. 
Although our study is context specific and we do not claim the specific results to be 
generalisable, they illustrate a more generally plausible assertion concerning the relevance and 
implementation of information security awareness activities within government-sector 
organisations in developing countries. They place individual employees aims and preferences 
in a wider organisational context and help to explain why organisational members take certain 
preferences and actions. We hope that our proposed type of theorisation - rare in the 
mainstream information security research, more accustomed to the deductive application of 
theory to empirical settings  adds to the ongoing development of the information security 
awareness research direction. 
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Table 1  Profile of participants 
Interviewee Affiliation Job title Age Gender Years of 
experience 
IT skills 
1 Masud Planning & 
Development 
Industrial 
Coordinator 
 
25  29 M 5 - 10 Good 
2 Qadir Information 
Systems 
Coordinator 
 
25  29 M < 5 Excellent 
3 Adil Environmental 
Consultant 
 
25  29 M < 5 Excellent 
4 Umar Finance Auditing 
Specialist 
 
35  39 M > 10 Good 
5 Omar Technical 
Affairs 
 
Economist 30  34 M 5 - 10 Excellent 
6 Abbas 
 
 
Support 
Services 
Director 25  29 M 5 - 10 Excellent 
7 Imad Customer Support 
Coordinator 
 
30  34 M > 10 Good 
8 Daoud CEO Office Advisor  
 
25  29 M 5 - 10 Good 
9 Saida Analytics 
Consultant 
 
35  39 
 
F > 10 Excellent 
10 Jamal Public 
Relations 
Executive 
Spokesperson 
 
35  39 
 
M 5 - 10 Excellent 
11 Tarek Maintenance Inspector 
 
30  34 M 5 - 10 Good 
12 Fadil Human 
Resources 
Manager 
 
 M > 10 Good 
13 Salim Director 
 
35  39 M > 10 Excellent 
14 Farida Educational 
Institutes 
 
Trainer-Assessor 25  29 F 5 - 10 Good 
15 Ghazi Project 
Management 
 
Manager 35  39 M > 10 Excellent 
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Table 2  Information Security policy documents 
Policy Code Description 
 
AU12013 Highlights appropriate and inappropriate uses of Information Technology resources 
and services in the Agency. 
IS12013 Details the Agencys Information Security guidelines and recommended security 
controls. 
IU2013 Outlines the appropriate and inappropriate uses of the Agencys internet services 
namely email and internet browsing activities. 
ISG Summarises the Agencys Information Security policy and guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Table 3 - Refined themes and final themes: illustrative data 
 
Perceived impact of information security awareness  
ISA as duty of care We have an independent information security division and I have 
noticed that there is an interest, care and seriousness, and such 
seriousness must be reflected on the information security 
awareness of employees (Omar, Economist)  
ISA as a dynamic knowledge 
process 
For an information security campaign to be effective, it needs an 
acceptable mechanism that does not negatively impact on work and 
integrates well with it (Fadil, Human Resources Manager)  
ISA as proactive behaviour If there is a continuous flow of information and warnings, people 
will get used to it and start adopting certain behaviours almost 
naturally. It becomes an ingrained reminder of how to act, it 
becomes culture (Ghazi, Project Manager)  
Desired impact of information security awareness  
Actionable knowledge to 
increase resilience 
For me, I think the cognitive side is very important. That is, the 
knowledge gained through these initiatives is very rewarding to 
me. It can reduce the risks that can compromise the Agencys 
systems. This brings benefits to everyone, also on a personal level 
(Masud, Industrial Coordinator) 
Focus on measuring security 
levels 
People should have the required information to avoid the loss of 
equipment, time and effort and the data that might be leaked or 
exposed (Fadil, Human Resources Manager) 
High engagement through 
online learning, simulation and 
interaction 
Traditional training courses take time from employees, and I do 
not think that every department will be able to send their 
employees to attend those... training staff for a long period or 
having a course for a period of several days is not suitable and there 
are online alternatives that are more interactive (Jamal, Executive 
Spokesperson).  
Positioning the information 
security function for influence 
In many matters, the Agency is trying hard to protect itself, but 
certainly the risk will always be present because of the actions 
individuals. Certainly, with more than one type of awareness 
initiative, the benefits will be greater (EIT29F5H) 
Perceived challenges and enablers of information security awareness 
Organisational citizenship The underlying basis of all work here is peoples awareness that 
the strength of the Agencys credibility depends on information 
security. That is a shared concern (Umar, Auditing Specialist).  
Rejection of punitive action If an employee is using his devices in the right way or using the 
official sites and channels to perform work...he is not doing 
anything positive or negative. He is merely doing the right thing. 
Sanctions in this context would be disastrous (Jamal, Executive 
Spokesperson)  
Expansion of security-threat 
intelligence 
They [organisational insiders] need more in-depth explanation or 
even face-to-face interaction. They need to implement practically 
what they learn or to have a specialist at hand who is able to 
provide them with answers (Ghazi, Project Manager) 
Knowledge-based self-
regulation 
Variety is something required, so an employee does not get bored 
is exposed to change and new experiences. Renewing content is 
important so that at every period something different is done 
(Tarek, Inspector)  
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Figure 1  Organisational structure at the case government Agency 
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Appendix 1  Interview guide 
QUESTIONS PURPOSE 
 
Organisational introduction 
 
1) As a governmental organisation in Saudi Arabia, what has been 
your experience of information security, from the perspectives 
of policy, awareness and enforcement?  
2) As an organisational insider, how would you describe your 
experience with information security policy and awareness 
interventions? For instance, have you encountered any 
information security issues, positive or negative experiences, 
or do you have practical insights you could tell me more about 
that relate to your role? 
To obtain background 
information on personal 
role and experience 
within the organisation  
 
Landscape 
 
 
3) In the current context, organisations are implementing 
information security awareness programs that include a set of 
activities such as security awareness training. In your view, 
what is the real purpose of information security awareness, and 
how is it possible to deliver on its objectives? 
 
To explore the wider 
contextual influences of 
information security 
awareness interventions 
Information security behaviour 
4) Based on you experience of working with and managing 
people in the Agency, what type of activities or interventions 
would you say contribute in a most effective way towards 
improving individual information security behaviour?  
Prompts: previous information security knowledge; attitudes; 
values  
5) What role specifically do you think belongs to senior 
management in terms of developing a culture that promotes 
stronger information security awareness. On the other hand, 
what do you think might hinder the impact of information 
security awareness interventions? 
 
 
To explore the factors 
that influence 
information security 
awareness 
Information security awareness interventions 
6) Can you take me through the range of information awareness 
activities that are set in place at the Agency, especially those 
that involve training, campaigns, especially designed 
materials, simulations or other? 
7) Looking back in more detail at the activities you have just 
talked me through, which in your view are more effective and 
which could be improved and how? 
 
 
To identify perceived 
strengths and 
weaknesses of 
information security 
awareness interventions 
Close 
8) Are there any other comments/observations that you would 
like to make regarding the role of information security 
awareness in the context of governmental organisations?  
 
 
Participants profile 
- Age 
- Gender 
- Years of experience in the government sector 
- Department 
- Current job position 
- Computer skills (below average, good, excellent) 
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